topic: null in a permission entry now matches any topic, allowing broad grants without specifying a specific topic. set-mail-permission topic param is now optional; omitting it stores null (wildcard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
192 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
192 lines
7.1 KiB
Markdown
# claude-code-conduit
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A supervised action bridge between Claude Code and the host system. Claude requests structured actions; the server applies per-action policies and optionally holds them for human approval before executing.
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## Concepts
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**Actions** are typed verbs with named parameters — not shell commands. The server defines what actions exist and what happens when they are called. Example:
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```json
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{ "action": "edit-file", "filename": "/workspace/foo.mjs" }
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```
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**Policies** control what happens when an action is requested:
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- `auto-accept` — executed immediately (e.g. open a file in the editor)
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- `auto-deny` — rejected immediately
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- `queue` — held for human approval (e.g. open a browser URL)
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**Authentication** uses HMAC-SHA256. Every request is signed with the caller's secret. Secrets live in a JSON file — never in environment variables.
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**Users** each have a secret and a `canApprove` list controlling whose queued actions they may approve.
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---
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## Install
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```bash
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# Global install from Gitea
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npm install -g git+https://gitea.efforting.tech/mikael-lovqvists-claude-agent/claude-code-conduit.git
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# Or clone and link locally
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git clone git@git.efforting.tech:mikael-lovqvists-claude-agent/claude-code-conduit.git
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cd claude-code-conduit
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npm install
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npm link
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```
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### Generate secrets
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```bash
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# Create a secrets file with random secrets for each user
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ccc-keygen --create user,agent
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# Edit secrets.json to configure who can approve whom:
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# set user.canApprove = ["agent"]
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# Produce a filtered file for the agent (e.g. to copy into a Docker container)
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ccc-keygen --filter agent --output agent-secrets.json
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```
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The full `secrets.json` stays on the host. `agent-secrets.json` goes into the container.
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---
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## Running
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### Server (host)
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```bash
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ccc-server --secrets secrets.json
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ccc-server --secrets secrets.json --mail-perms mail-perms.json
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```
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Server flags:
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| Flag | Env variable | Description |
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|------|-------------|-------------|
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| `--secrets <path>` | — | Path to secrets file (required) |
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| `--bind <addr>` | `CONDUIT_BIND` | Address to bind to (default `127.0.0.1`) |
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| `--mail-perms <path>` | `CONDUIT_MAIL_PERMS` | File to persist mail permissions (optional; in-memory only if omitted) |
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| `--dry-run` | — | Log all action invocations but do not execute them |
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Server environment variables:
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| Variable | Default | Description |
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|----------|---------|-------------|
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| `CONDUIT_PORT` | `3015` | Port to listen on |
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| `CONDUIT_BIND` | `127.0.0.1` | Address to bind to |
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| `CONDUIT_ROOT` | `/workspace` | Label printed at startup (informational only — path resolution uses `VOLUME_MAPPING` in `server/helpers.mjs`) |
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### Client (container / agent)
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```bash
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ccc-client --secrets agent-secrets.json --user agent --url http://192.168.2.99:3015 '{"action": "list-actions"}'
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ccc-client --secrets agent-secrets.json --user agent '{"action": "edit-file", "filename": "/workspace/foo.mjs"}'
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```
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`--secrets`, `--user`, and `--url` can also be set via environment variables:
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```bash
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export CCC_SECRETS=/path/to/agent-secrets.json
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export CCC_USER=agent
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export CONDUIT_URL=http://192.168.2.99:3015
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ccc-client '{"action": "list-actions"}'
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```
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The JSON payload can be spread across multiple arguments — they are space-joined before parsing:
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```bash
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ccc-client '{"action": "edit-file",' '"filename": "/workspace/foo.mjs"}'
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```
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### Queue manager (host)
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```bash
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ccc-queue --secrets secrets.json --user user --url http://192.168.2.99:3015
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```
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Opens an interactive TUI showing pending actions:
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```
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┌─ Pending Actions ──────────┐ ┌─ Details ────────────────────────────┐
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│ │ │ │
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│ > [a1b2c3] open-browser │ │ Action: open-browser │
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│ [d4e5f6] open-terminal │ │ ID: a1b2c3d4-... │
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│ │ │ Submitted by: agent │
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│ │ │ Created: 2026-03-07T12:00:00Z │
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│ │ │ │
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│ │ │ Params: │
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│ │ │ url: https://example.com │
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└────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────────────┘
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[y] approve [n] deny [r] refresh [q] quit
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```
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Client environment variables:
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| Variable | Default | Description |
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|----------|---------|-------------|
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| `CCC_SECRETS` | — | Path to secrets file |
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| `CCC_USER` | — | Username to authenticate as |
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| `CONDUIT_URL` | `http://localhost:3015` | Server URL |
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---
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## Actions
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Query available actions at runtime:
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```bash
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ccc-client '{"action": "list-actions"}'
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```
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Built-in actions:
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| Action | Policy | Params |
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|--------|--------|--------|
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| `list-actions` | auto-accept | — |
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| `edit-file` | auto-accept | `filename` (path) |
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| `open-browser` | queue | `url` (http/https only) |
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| `open-terminal` | queue | `path` (optional, defaults to workspace) |
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| `send-email` | auto-accept | `to`, `subject`, `body`, `topic` |
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| `set-mail-permission` | auto-accept | `target_user`, `to`, `allow` (bool), `topic` (optional — omit to match any topic) |
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| `get-mail-permissions` | auto-accept | `target_user` (optional) |
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`send-email` checks that the caller has a mail permission entry matching `(caller, to, topic)` before sending. Permissions are managed via `set-mail-permission`, which requires the caller to have `canApprove` over the target user — so only humans can grant/revoke permissions for agents.
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### Adding actions
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Edit `server/actions.mjs`. Each entry needs:
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```js
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'my-action': {
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description: 'What this does',
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params: [{ name: 'foo', required: true, type: 'string' }],
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policy: 'auto-accept', // or 'auto-deny' | 'queue'
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handler: ({ foo }, ctx) => {
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// ctx = { caller, users, mail_perm_store, mailer_send }
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// ctx is optional — omit the second argument if you don't need it
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return { result: foo };
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},
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},
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```
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---
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## Path resolution
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The server translates container-side paths to host-side paths using the volume map in `server/helpers.mjs`. By default this matches the `docker-compose.yml` layout:
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| Container path | Host path |
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|----------------|-----------|
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| `/workspace` | `<CONTAINER_PATH>/workspace` |
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| `/home/claude` | `<CONTAINER_PATH>/claude-home` |
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Paths outside known volumes are rejected. Edit `CONTAINER_PATH` and `VOLUME_MAPPING` in `server/helpers.mjs` to match your setup.
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---
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## Security notes
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- Secrets are never passed via environment variables or command line arguments — only via a file
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- HMAC signatures include a timestamp; requests older than 30 seconds are rejected
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- `canApprove` is empty by default — permissions must be explicitly granted
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- Browser URLs are validated to `http`/`https` only before being passed to `xdg-open`
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- All path arguments are resolved against the volume map; traversal outside known volumes is rejected
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